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In this work we explore how the international outsourcing of production (offshoring) impacts the skill 
composition of Italian manufacturing firms. In particular, our aim is to assess if the choice to offshore 
production activities to cheap-labour countries implies a bias in the employment of skilled workers relative 
to unskilled workers.  
Using a balanced panel of firms across the period 1995-2003, we set up a counterfactual analysis in which, 
by using a difference-in-differences propensity score matching estimator, we compare the dynamics of skill 
demand for treated and control firms while addressing the possible problem of selection bias.  
Our results point to identify a “potential” skill bias effect of production offshoring. In particular, we find that 
treated firms tend to show an upward shift in the skill ratio with respect to the counterfactual sample, but 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero. When we look at the elements of the skill ratio 
separately, we find that the skill bias is significantly driven by a fall in the employment of production 
workers (blue collars), rather than by the increase in the employment of nonproduction workers (white 
collars), thus providing further evidence on the unskilled labour-saving nature of international outsourcing.  
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1. Introduction 
During the last three decades the way goods are manufactured has dramatically changed. A new 
international division of labour has emerged that is characterised by firms fragmenting the entire 
value chain – from product design to assembling and distribution -  into modules that are moved to 
different locations on a global scale in order to exploit localization advantages and factor costs 
differentials.  
The fall in trade barriers and transportation costs, the rapid diffusion of information and 
communication technologies and the recent economic transformations occurred in Eastern Europe, 
together with the emergence of countries like Brazil, China, India and Russia, have been 
responsible of the recent increase in the international fragmentation of production in Western 
economies. Concerning this, trade statistics show a steady increase of intra-industry trade flows (in 
the form of outward processing trade) between European Union and the rest of the world in a 
relatively short period of time (Mariotti and Mutinelli 2005; UNCTAD 2006; Baldone, Sdogati and 
Tajoli 2007). 
In this framework, Italy can be considered as a late comer with respect to the other European 
partners: the characteristics of its industrial composition, primarily made by small and medium 
firms, have typically represented a barrier to the development of activities on an international scale 
(Onida 2004; Federico 2006). The current volume of foreign direct investments (FDI) on GDP, for 
instance, is still scarce if referred to the amount of FDI flowing out from other comparable 
industrialised economies (UNCTAD 2006). Nevertheless, the overseas delocalization of production 
and service activities has rapidly increased also in Italy, particularly involving those sectors (the so 
called Made in Italy: food, textile and clothing, industrial machinery, furniture) in which firms show 
a high level of specialization (Centro Studi Capitalia 2001, 2004; Helg and Tajoli 2005; Falzoni and 
Tajoli 2008)
3.  
                                                 
3 According to Centro Studi Capitalia (2001, 2004), the share of firms offshoring production raised from 2% to 5% 
between 1998 and 2003. Falzoni and Tajoli (2008), relying on input-output data provided by the National Statistical   3
One of the main consequences of this phenomenon is that, next to an extensive use of IT capital, 
imported materials and intermediate services, an increasing replacement of low-skill employment is 
occurring due to the fact that firms are sub-contracting the less knowledge-intensive activities. 
Trade flows, import competition and FDI, thus, can result in a reorganization of production through 
which home firms can specialize on the high-value-added phases of the value chain while 
economizing on production costs. 
The increasing fear of job losses, particularly referred to low-skill intensive tasks and occupations, 
is making international fragmentation of production a ‘hot topic’ both for medias and for academic 
research. Traditionally, two main explanations have been given to account for the shift in demand 
away from low-skilled workers in industrialized countries. The first refers to non-neutral 
technological change that, by fostering the demand for more qualified workers within 
technologically advanced industries, tends either to increase the wage inequality in relatively 
flexible labour markets (like in the US and UK) or to increase the relative unemployment of less 
qualified workers in relatively more rigid ones (as in Germany, France, Denmark and Italy).  
The second claims for increased international trade and globalization of production, according to 
which labour is relocated in a way that determines a shift of redundant and routinized activities 
toward less-developed countries, while keeping non-routinized, high skill-intensive activities at 
home, thus increasing the domestic firms' comparative advantage in the production of high-value 
added goods. 
Recent international evidence (Brainard and Litan 2004; Amiti and Wei 2005), however, shows also 
that the increasing digitization of production enables firms not only to offshore pure manufacturing 
processes, but also service activities like software programming, medical diagnosis, lab research, 
product development and analytical activities, hence creating the conditions for the transfer of 
knowledge-intensive jobs. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Office (ISTAT), find that, while service offshoring increased from a 0.52% in 1992 to 2.06% in 2003, the offshoring of 
materials and goods raised in the same period from 18.34% to 26.42%.    4
With this piece of work we aim at assessing if, and to what extent, the firm’s decision to offshore 
production to low-wage countries alters the skill intensity of domestic employment. On this 
purpose, we conduct our empirical exercise in a framework closed to a laboratory experiment, in 
which we employ a semi-parametric difference-in-differences propensity score matching estimator 
in order to control for sample selection and unobserved heterogeneity among observations and 
across the years.  
Our counterfactual analysis is developed on a sample of Italian manufacturing firms that have been 
active from 1995 to 2003. The estimation results seem to support the possible existence of a skill-
bias effect of production offshoring, but only driven by a fall in the demand for unskilled workers. 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the empirical literature focused on the 
skill-bias effects of offshoring. Section 3 describes data and the empirical methodology adopted. 
Section 4 presents and discusses the estimation results and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background literature 
Even if it is considered a 'hot topic' for economists, the impact of globalization on the international 
division of labour and the employment dynamics of workers is still ambiguous. 
After trade and technological change, international fragmentation, international outsourcing and 
offshoring have been considered as potential explanations for the rising income and employment 
differentials between skilled and unskilled workers (Feenstra and Hanson 1996; Egger and 
Falkinger 2003; Chusseau, Dumont and Hellier 2008). However, the question if the international 
relocation of production determines a change in the skill intensity of jobs is still unanswered, both 
in theory and in the evidence. While traditional trade models based on the Hecksher-Olin-
Samuelson framework argue that the move of low-skill intensive stages of production abroad 
decreases the demand for the relatively less abundant factor at home, other studies predict a more 
ambiguous impact of international outsourcing on low-skilled workers in the source country (Arndt 
1997; Glass and Saggi 2001; Jones and Kierzkowski 2001).    5
What seems to emerge from the theoretical literature is that such effect depends on which type of 
production or service is offshored, on the factor intensity of both the processes that remain in the 
home country and the ones that are relocated internationally (Kohler 2003; Egger and Falkinger 
2003; Egger and Egger 2003), and, finally, on the sector in which offshoring occurs (Arndt 1997). 
The empirical literature on the skill bias effects of international outsourcing can be divided in two 
main lines of research. A first set of studies looks at offshoring in terms of FDI and distinguishes 
between vertical and horizontal FDI (Markusen et al. 1996; Lipsey 2002). While the former is 
mainly driven by the will of exploiting the differences in factors endowments and prices, and leads 
to a net decrease in domestic employment (Agarwal 1997; Braconier and Ekholm 2000; Mariotti, 
Mutinelli and Piscitello 2003), the latter is primarily driven by the will to replicate abroad the whole 
production process of the home country, with the aim of finding new markets and global 
opportunities and with the effect of increasing both the employment and the skill intensity of 
domestic jobs (Markusen et al. 1996; Blömstrom, Fors and Lipsey 1997; Mariotti, Mutinelli and 
Piscitello 2003). 
A particular, and still less explored, issue concerns the effect of FDI and offshoring on the quality 
of labour, i.e. on the skill composition of employment. The question becomes: does investing in 
cheap-labour countries lead to a skill upgrading at home? 
Head and Ries (2002) try to answer this question by looking at Japanese multinationals in the 
period 1965-1990: their results point to a positive relationship between offshoring and the demand 
for skilled labour only if production re-location is directed to developing countries and only when 
the unit of analysis is the firm instead of the industry. Similarly, Hansson (2004) finds that 
production delocalization toward less developed countries contributes to the general increase in the 
average level of qualification within Swedish multinationals. In contrast with these results, 
Slaughter (2000), looking at 32 US manufacturing industries in the 1980s, does not show clear 
results in favour of the positive relationship between FDI and the employment of skilled workers at 
home.   6
For Italy, Castellani, Mariotti and Piscitello (2008), merging the Reprint dataset provided by the 
national Institute for Foreign Trade (ICE) with the Outlook on Balance Sheets  of Italian 
incorporated companies and the Excelsior database on Italian employment provided by the national 
Chambers of Commerce (Unioncamere) for the period 1998-2004, find a skill upgrading effect only 
for firms investing in Central and Eastern Europe with respect to firms that remained domestic. 
Relying on the Capitalia dataset and working on a sample of about 500 manufacturing firms over 
the 1980s and over the 1990s respectively, Piva and Vivarelli (2002, 2004) also do not find any 
significant effect of FDI on the skill composition of Italian employment, even if the nature of the 
data and of results do not exclude a priori any possible influence
4.  
A second group of studies, primarily based on the “new international trade theory”, focuses instead 
on the increasing fragmentation of production and looks at international outsourcing as a relatively 
new form of trade involving intermediate goods and processes. According to Jones and 
Kierzkowski (2001), international fragmentation can be thought as a process of splitting up and 
spread of previously integrated stages of production over an international network of production 
sites. More specifically, “outsourcing” refers to the relocation of jobs and processes to external 
providers regardless of their location, while “offshoring” refers to the relocation of jobs and 
processes to any foreign country, without distinguishing whether the provider is external or 
affiliated with the firm
5. The term “offshoring outsourcing”, instead, strictly covers the relocation of 
jobs and activities to an external and internationally located provider (Olsen 2006)
6.  
                                                 
4 Similar results also emerge when looking at international joint ventures (JVs) of Italian firms. In this respect, Barba 
Navaretti, Santarelli and Vivarelli (2002), for instance, relying on a cross-sectional dataset of 172 JVs interviewed in 
1998, find that only JVs motivated by the search for lower labour costs, as well as those established with East European 
firms, are associated with a higher employment performance with respect to the average.  
5 Alternatively, the Oxford English Dictionary defines offshoring as the action or practice of moving or basing a 
business operation abroad, usually to take advantage of lower costs (http://dictionary.oed.com/). 
6 The partial or total transfer of the production of goods or services abroad to non-affiliated enterprises, through 
subcontracting abroad, is defined by  OECD (2007) as offshoring in the broad sense.    7
The evidence available from the international trade literature provides general support for the skill-
biased nature of production relocation
7. Wood (1994), for instance, calculates that import 
competition determines a reduction in the demand for unskilled labour by 30% in 1990. On the 
same line, Sachs and Shatz (1994) conclude that production internationalization exerts a double 
effect on overall labour composition: it is not only the cause of a general decrease in manufacturing 
but, together with technological change, is a determinant of the decline in the relative demand for 
low-skilled workers.  Moreover, Feenstra and Hanson (1996) provide some evidence that, for the 
period 1972-1990, international outsourcing is responsible of a 30% to 50% rise in the demand for 
skilled workers, and, thus, for a rise in income inequality. 
For the UK, Anderton and Brenton (1999) estimate that, between 1970 and 1986, imports from low-
wage countries determine a negative impact of about 40% on the wage-bill share and relative 
employment of low-skilled workers. This result is further supported by Hijzen, Görg and Hine 
(2004), who show that, between 1982 and 1996, international outsourcing has a strong negative 
impact on the demand for semi-skilled and unskilled labour. 
For France, Strauss-Khan (2003) finds that the highly increasing vertical specialization, i.e. the 
share of imported inputs in production, is the main determinant of the sharp decline in the share of 
unskilled workers between 1977 and 1993, passed from -15% in the period 1977-85 to -25% 
between 1985 and 1993.  
For Austria, instead, a positive and significant effect on skilled labour comes out only when using 
proxies of international trade like export openness and outsourcing, while a negative effect arises 
when considering import penetration (Dell’mour et al. 2000). 
For the Italian case, finally, the scanty evidence seems to support the positive relationship between 
offshoring and the relative demand for skilled labour. Helg and Tajoli (2005), for instance, compare 
the effect of international fragmentation of production (computed from input-output data on 
                                                 
7 For a comprehensive survey on North-South trade models explaining the widening wage inequality between skilled 
and unskilled workers see Chusseau, Dumont and Hellier (2008).   8
outward processing trade) on the skill ratio on 20 manufacturing sectors in Italy and in Germany 
during the 1990s and show that a positive and significant impact emerges only for the former, while 
for the latter the effect seems to be not significant
8.  
Summing up, the most recent literature on skill-bias international fragmentation seems to stress the 
negative impact of production offshoring on the employment and pay of unskilled relative to skilled 
workers. However, what also emerges is that country-specific effects, together with different 
measurement and econometric techniques, matter in explaining these effects.  
 
3. Methodology and data 
3.1. Data  
The dataset consists in a sample of Italian manufacturing firms drawn from the VII, VIII and IX 
waves of the Survey on Manufacturing Firms (Indagine sulle Imprese Manifatturiere) provided by 
Capitalia (formerly Mediocredito Centrale) and covering the period 1995-2003. Interviews were 
conducted respectively in 1998, 2001 and 2004. For each survey all the firms with more than 500 
employees were interviewed, while for those firms having more than 11 employees and less than 
500 the Survey identifies a representative sample stratified by geographical area, industry and 
employment size. The three waves, 1995-1997, 1998-2000 and 2001-2003 gather information on 
4.497, 4.680 and 4.289 firms respectively. 
In order to work on a balanced panel, we first merge the three surveys and we identify a sample of 
414 firms always present across nine years. Firms offshoring production in 1998-2000 are 16 
(3.8%) out of 414, which are a slightly overrepresented sample with respect to the percentage 
(1.9%) that emerges when we look only at the full 1998-2000 wave (Centro Studi Capitalia 2001).  
                                                 
8 Similar results for the German case emerge also in Fitzenberger (1999) and Falk and Koebel (2000), who find no 
evidence that international outsourcing of production and services positively affect the skill composition of 
manufacturing workforce. Rather, Fitzenberger leaves technology the dominant role in shifting away the employment of 
unskilled workers.   9
In order to avoid bad matches in the construction of the counterfactual, we further dropped 
observations belonging to industries (classified by ATECO 1991 standard, in line with ISIC Rev. 
3.1 and NACE Rev. 1.1) in which no firm has moved production abroad. For the same reason, we 
also excluded other groups of firms potentially conducive to misleading results. Specifically, we 
first dropped firms with missing values in balance sheets data; then we dropped firms having 
undergone takeovers or break-ups and, finally, firms which delocalized production before and after 
the treatment period 1998-2000
9. This passage is particularly important for the correct specification 
of the treatment variable. In our case, we select only those firms that offshored production in 1998-
2000, so that we avoid any possible spurious effect on the outcome coming from previous or 
subsequent offshoring activities. At the end of this procedure we obtain a panel of 184 firms 
suitable for the analysis. 
The structure of the sample is reported below. Table 1a shows the distribution of firms by industry 
and employment classes. As expected, the major part of the firms in our final sample is of small and 
medium size, and this holds for each industry coded by 2-digit ATECO 1991 standard (textile and 
clothing, leather and footwear, chemicals, rubber and plastics, metal products, industrial 
machinery). 
 
TABLE 1a AROUND HERE 
 
Table 1b, instead, shows the structure of the sample by employment classes and geographical area 
and compares the merged sample (1995-2003) before and after data cleaning with the two original 
                                                 
9 It must be stressed that, in the period under examination, offshoring is still a limited phenomenon  in Italy. In 
particular, according to Centro Studi Capitalia (2001, 2004), it involves about 2% of firms in 1998-2000 and about 5% 
of firms in 2001-2003. In each Survey, the question used to identify offshoring firms is the following: “Did the firm 
delocalize its own production activities in Central-Eastern European Countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria) and ex-Yugoslavia during the triennium 1998-2000?”   10
surveys (1995-1997 and 1998-2000) and with 2001 Census data as given by National Statistical 
Office (ISTAT 2001).  
 
TABLE 1b AROUND HERE 
 
If we look at the last two columns of Table 1b, it is easy to note that the cleaning process has led to 
a re-alignment of the sample to the original structure of the data. However, although in line with the 
first survey (1995-1997), if compared with Census data, the final (after cleaning) sample slightly 
over-represents middle and large firms, and firms located in the North of Italy.  This bias basically 
arises for two reasons. First, the Capitalia samples are stratified such that larger firms are much 
more likely to be included, and this occurs because firms with more than 500 employees are totally 
included (by Census) while firms with less than 500 employees are sampled on the base of their 
geographical location, sector of economic activity and size. Second, small firms generally show 
both a higher propensity to exit the market and a higher propensity to be merged with other firms, 
so that, in a panel structure, they are much more likely to be excluded than larger firms. 
Table 2 instead shows the distribution of treated and untreated units by industry, employment size 
and geographical area.  
 
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
From a strict econometric point of view, the limited number of treated units does not represent a 
crucial issue for the application of the empirical analysis. What is important is the relative 
dimension of the untreated sample, which needs to be large enough in order to draw an appropriate 
counterfactual set. The basic idea of matching estimations is to find in a large group of non-
participants in the treatment the firms which are similar to the participants in all relevant pre-
treatment characteristics.  In our case, the ratio between treated and untreated units is 1 to 25, so   11
that the pool of possible control units is relatively large and the counterfactual analysis reliable. 
Table 3 shows some summary statistics for offshoring and non offshoring firms
10.   
 
TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
The Table summarizes the variables that are supposed to be relevant in the following empirical 
analysis, as they can potentially affect both the propensity to move production abroad (see section 
3.3) and the demand for skills. In particular, we focus on investments in technology (i.e. ICT 
equipment), the export activity, the composition of the workforce by occupation, the capital 
intensity, the average productivity and the labour cost per employee
11. 
As we can see, the average size of treated units is higher than the average size of untreated; in 
addition, the treated sample is characterized by a slightly lower share of skilled workers (0.357) 
than the untreated sample (0.479) and a higher share of unskilled workers (0.767). If the offshoring 
of low-skill intensive activities to cheap-labour countries is responsible for such a picture is the 
object of the following empirical exercise.  
Notwithstanding these differences, simple t-tests did not reject the hypothesis of the equality of 
means between treated and control units
12.  
However, the limited number of treated firms leads us to consider our empirical exercise more like 




                                                 
10 Summary statistics for the merged sample are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
11 See the Appendix for a more detailed description of the variables. 
12 The results of the t-test are not reported here, but are available on request. The balancing property test described in 
Section 3.4 also confirms that our treated observations are not different than counterfactuals.    12
3.2. Empirical methodology 
Empirical studies testing the skill-biased international trade hypothesis are generally based on the 
estimation of short-run cost functions, reflecting the cost-minimizing behaviour of firms. The most 
utilised flexible cost function is generally the dual of the transcendental logarithmic production 
function, as proposed by Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1973). 
However useful, this approach suffers from two major limitations: on the one hand, it relies on a 
“simple” cost function framework, which is subject to a set of ad hoc regularity conditions – i.e. 
symmetry and homogeneity of parameters and constant returns to scale - that are necessary for its 
analytical tractability; on the other, it is linked to a specific functional form that constraints the 
parameters to assume specific values
13. Furthermore, if only limited information is available on the 
employment composition and on firms’ characteristics, a possible problem of sample selection may 
arise, according to which the set of firms which decide to transfer production abroad cannot be 
thought as randomly drawn from the whole population. 
In the following analysis, instead, we employ a treatment effect estimation based on matching a 
certain set of offshoring firms (treated group) with a counterfactual set of firms that are supposed to 
be similar on the base of a certain vector of relevant characteristics X. Since conditioning on all 
relevant covariates is a “data hungry” process in case of a high dimensional vector X
14, Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) suggest to use the so called balancing score b(X), i.e. a function of the relevant 
observed covariates X such that the conditional distribution of X given b(X) is independent of 
assignment into treatment.  
In this paper we employ a semi-parametric approach based on propensity score, i.e. the probability 
to be assigned into a treatment conditional on observed characteristics, developed within the 
                                                 
13 See Barnett, Lee and Wolfe (1985) and Dumont (2005) for a treatment of the drawbacks linked to the use of a 
translog cost function. In particular, Barnett (1985) shows how the translog function tends to violate regularity 
conditions within the data region.  
14 This problem is defined as ‘curse of dimensionality’.    13
evaluation literature in a context of observational data (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 1996; Heckman 
1990, 1997; Heckman, Hichimura and Todd 1997; Heckman, LaLonde and Smith 1999; Sianesi 
2004; Wooldridge 2001; Smith and Todd 2005).  
Propensity score matching (PSM) has become a popular approach for estimating causal treatment 
effects and it is a more flexible technique with respect to standard labour demand estimation: first, it 
does not force the imposition of a parametric specification of the relations of interest; second, it 
allows to handle the selection bias that can occur when dealing with potentially endogenous 
variables; third, when applied to longitudinal data, it allows to tackle  the issue of unobserved 
heterogeneity among observation. In particular, the difference-in-differences (DID) matching 
estimator (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1997) helps to remove temporally invariant differences in 
outcomes between treated and untreated units that can persist even once conditioning on 
observables.  
The DID-PSM consists of a two-stage model of estimation. In the first stage, one should estimate 
the probability to be assigned into treatment given a certain set of observables, which are supposed 
either to be fixed over time or to be measured before the assignment into the treatment.   
In the second stage, one should use the propensity score in order to estimate the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT). In our case the outcome variables are the difference-in-differences of 
the skill ratio of the workforce and the difference-in-differences of the employment share by 
occupational category.  
When choosing the matching algorithm, the high number of potential controls for each treated unit 
makes appropriate and feasible the use of the nearest neighbour (NN) method, which allows to 
match one treated unit with one counterfactual, thus minimizing the bias in the estimation 
(Caliendo, Hujer and Thomsen 2005; Smith and Todd 2005; Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008).  
The ATT is then computed in the following way: 
   14
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where t N is the number of offshoring firms,  Y  is the difference between the outcome variables (i.e. 
the skill ratios) before and after the participation into the treatment, and W is the weight assigned to 
each comparison unit in the construction of the counterfactual outcome. Both treated and untreated 
units are intended to be on the common support
15. 
The main aim of the DID-PSM method is to generate a set of non-offshoring (not treated) firms as 
much similar as possible to the offshoring (treated) ones in order to get a proxy of what would have 
happened to domestic skill composition within offshoring firms if they had not chosen to relocate 
activities abroad and then testing whether the outcome of the offshoring firms significantly differ 
from that of the counterfactual (non offshoring) group
16. 
 
3.3. Propensity score estimation 
A crucial hypothesis that needs to be satisfied in order to correctly implementing the PSM can be 
expressed as follows:  
) ( | X P X D   
where P(X) is the propensity score, D the treatment variable and X the observable variables. The 
condition means that the balancing of the pre-treatment variables is satisfied given the propensity 
score. Put it another way, the balancing property is satisfied “when observations with the same 
propensity score […] have the same distribution of observable (and unobservable) characteristics 
independently of treatment status” (Becker and Ichino 2002, p. 2). 
                                                 
15 Due to the small dimension of our sample, we adopt a NN DID-PSM estimator with replacement.  
16 The works of Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) and Smith and Todd (2005) provide a useful guidance for the practical 
implementation of the matching procedure.    15
For the empirical implementation of PSM we first estimate the probability of being an offshoring 
firm (the propensity score), conditional on a set of observable characteristics
17. Since our treatment 
is a binary variable, we choose a probit specification. Furthermore, since the matching strategy 
relies on the conditional independence assumption (CIA) requiring that the outcome variables must 
be independent of treatment conditional on the propensity score
18, we select variables X that 
credibly satisfy this condition. The Xs are supposed not only to affect the firm's decision to offshore 
production, but also to have an influence on the dependent variable, i.e. the skill composition of the 
labour force. Following the theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of international 
outsourcing, after controlling for firms’ geographical location and year dummies, we consider unit 
labour cost (Abraham and Taylor 1996), export propensity (Görg and Hanley 2004), the adoption of 
ICT and network technology (Tomiura 2004; Bartel, Lach and Sicherman 2005), as well as other 
structural variables like capital intensity (net capital stock over net sales) and average productivity 
(net sales per employee), and the lagged dependent variable, i.e. the pre-treatment skill ratio.  
In order to avoid problems of over-parameterization (Bryson, Dorsett and Purdon 2002), we choose 
a quite parsimonious set of variables for the first-stage specification of the model. Although it 
leaves the estimates unbiased, including too many variables in our model can increase their variance 
and can easily lead to the absence of a common support for treated and control units. Moreover, the 
                                                 
17 The propensity score is estimated on the basis of all the longitudinal information available (552 observations), in 
order exploit as much information as possible. 
18 The identification assumption may be expressed as: 
00 00 [ ( 1) ( 0)| , 1] [ ( 1) ( 0)| , 0] E Yt Yt X D E Yt Yt X D       
where 
0 Y is the outcome of the untreated units, D is the binary variable that indicates the treatment, t represents the 
time ( 0 = t before the treatment and  1 = t  after the treatment), X is a vector of conditioning variables. If this 
assumption holds, it means that the average outcome for treated and untreated would have followed the same path in the 
absence of treatment conditional on the vector of observable characteristics X.   16
set of relevant variables have been chosen on the base of our knowledge of the related literature and 
on their statistical significance, as suggested by Caliendo and Kopeining (2008).  
The probit estimates show expected results
19. Given the estimated coefficients of unit labour costs, 
as well as the ones of technology and export, are significant and positive it can be inferred that the 
main driving forces behind production offshoring are the will to save on wage and labour costs on 
the one side, and the previous adoption of ICT and the propensity to explore new markets through 
export on the other.  
  
3.4. Assessing PSM quality: the balancing property 
The next step in our analysis is to assess the quality of the matching. Since we determine the 
common support by conditioning on the propensity score, we have to check if the matching 
procedure can balance the distribution of the relevant variables in both the treatment and control 
group.  
Different methodologies can be employed for testing the balancing property: the basic idea of these 
approaches is to compare the situation before and after matching and check if there remain any 
differences after conditioning on the propensity score. If this is the case, and if there is still 
dependence on X, it means that the model could be not properly specified or the CIA could not hold  
(Smith and Todd 2005; Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). 
For our purpose, we adopt the stratification test developed by Deheja and Wahba (1999, 2002), and 
further implemented by Becker and Ichino (2002), according to which observations are divided into 
blocks based on the estimated propensity score, such that no statistically significant difference 
between the mean of the estimated propensity score in both the treatment and control group 
remains. Standard t-tests are then performed within each block in order to check if the distribution 
                                                 
19 The probit results and for the figure of propensity score distribution between treated and untreated are not reported 
here, but are available on request. Here we simply stress that the propensity score distribution is similar for both treated 
and untreated, being skewed to the left for both the groups.   17
of the X variables is the same between both groups; if any difference still remains, then blocks are 
further divided and the test repeated until the mean propensity score is the same between treated and 
counterfactual units.  
As can be seen from Table 4, the algorithm identifies two blocks within which the balancing 
property is satisfied. This means that, in each block, the mean propensity score for treated firms is 
not different from the one of the counterfactuals.   
 
TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
  
4. Empirical evidence 
4.1. Preliminary analysis 
A preliminary step in our counterfactual exercise consists in comparing the dynamics of the 
dependent variables in our treated and untreated samples as reported in Figure 1. If we look at total 
employment over time, we see that, although starting from a higher average level, treated units face 
a sharper decline in occupation than control units after the treatment.  
When focusing in detail on the dynamics of the non-production workers (proxied by white collars 
and including managers and officials, middle managers and executives, clerical staff) and 
production workers (proxied by blue collars and mainly including plant operators) employment 
shares the first difference to be noted concerns the relative position of white collars (WC) and blue 
collars (BC) shares in treated and untreated samples. Untreated units have in both periods higher 
shares of WC than treated once, while the opposite holds when we consider BC. In addition, after 
the offshoring period the trend of WC share seems to diverge for the two groups of firms, growing 
for untreated and decreasing for treated. As far as BC share is concerned we note a sharp decline in 
its value after the treatment for the firms, while for untreated the value of the BC share remains 
stable.    18
The last box in Figure 1 graphically summarizes the behaviour of the skill ratio over time, i.e. the 
share of non-production workers over production workers. As it can be easily seen, the initial gap in 
favour of non offshoring firms tends to decrease after the treatment: in front of a relatively stable 
trend of the skill ratio for the untreated units, the skill ratio of the treated sample seems to raise from 
an average of 0.3 in 1995-97 to an average of 0.4 in 2001-03
20.  
Generally speaking, the similar dynamics of each variable in the pre-treatment period between 
treated and untreated observations seems to support the validity of the identification assumption at 
the basis of the DID-PSM estimation: in the absence of the treatment, the outcome of the treated 
and of the untreated units would have followed equally distanced and stable paths over time. 
 In the following empirical analysis we investigate if, and to what extent, the treatment we consider 
(the fact of moving production abroad to cheap labour countries) may have played a role in 
modelling the skill employment dynamics illustrated in Figure 1. More in detail, we estimate if 
firms that moved production abroad in 1998-2000 employ, in average, a higher/lower share of 
skilled labour with respect to firms that, although could have been potentially moved production 
abroad, did not do that.  
 
 
FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
  
4.2. Estimation results 
We now turn the attention to the estimation results. Our analysis consists in the estimation of a two 
stage selection model, in which we first estimate the probability of a firm to be selected for the 
treatment (i.e. the decision to relocate production to cheap-labour countries), given a certain set of 
characteristics, and we secondly estimate the ATT on the base of the propensity score determined in 
                                                 
20 This also suggests the potential absence of any major unobserved shock that can have affected the workforce skill 
composition starting from the period 1998-2000.   19
the first stage. 
The dependent variable, i.e. the skill ratio, is calculated, in line with recent literature (Berman, 
Bound and Griliches 1994; Piva and Vivarelli 2004; Helg and Tajoli 2005), as the ratio between 
non-production workers and production workers. In addition, we repeat the analysis for the relative 
employment share of white collars (i.e. the numerator) and the relative employment share of blue 
collars (i.e. the denominator) separately, so to analyse the effect of offshoring on each element of 
the skill ratio. Finally, we construct an alternative indicator for unskilled employment by summing 
up the relative share of blue collars and the relative share of clerical workers. In this way, we build 
an alternative indicator which includes the semi-skilled and the unskilled components of the labour 
force (see Hijzen, Görg and Hine 2004)
21.  
Tables 5 to 8 show the outcome of the estimations. In Table 5, we estimate the effect of offshoring 
production on four specifications of the skill ratio (WC/BC): the first row is the difference between 
the average skill ratio in 2001-03 (post-treatment period) and the average skill ratio in 1995-97 (pre-
treatment period); the second, third, and fourth rows concern the difference between the skill ratio 
in each year after the treatment respectively (2001, 2002, and 2003) and the average skill ratio in 
the period before offshoring occurred (i.e. 1995-97). 
In order to control for different specifications of the DID-PS, we estimate two types of ATT: the 
first (ATT-1) is based on a first-stage DID-PS where we applied a logarithmic transformation to 
each continuous variable defining the characteristics of the firm (ULC, K/Y, Y/L, WC/BC), so that 
each coefficient of the estimation can be though in terms of elasticity. The second (ATT-2), instead, 
                                                 
21 In alternative, following the OECD (1998) classification, with this indicator we represent high-skilled and low-skilled 
blue-collars. We also build an indicator for high-skilled and low-skilled white collars, summing up separately the 
relative shares of managers and executives. However, due to the high number of firms with zero managers and zero 
executives, and operating a logarithmic transformation of their ratio, we miss too many information, so that our 
estimates, although significant, are not totally reliable and comparable with the ones of blue-collars. Tables and outputs 
on white collars estimations are not reported here, but are available on request   20
is based on a DID-PS calculated by holding each continuous variable in levels, and the coefficients 
of the ATT can be considered as semi-elasticities.  
In the following analysis, we separate the employment trends for skilled and unskilled workers in 
order to see whether the potential skill bias effect of international outsourcing is complementary or 
substitute with skilled and unskilled labour respectively. On this purpose, Table 6 reports the results 
for the relative share of white collars only, while Table 7 for blue collars only. Our estimations 
seem to confirm the unskilled labour-saving nature of production offshoring; while the 
complementarity with skilled labour is not totally confirmed (coefficients are always positive, but 
never significantly different from zero).  
These results still hold when we finally add the relative share of clerical workers to the relative 
share of blue collars (Table 8): in this case, however, coefficients are lower than in the blue collars 
case and the labour substitution effect caused by production offshoring is weaker.  
 
TABLE 5 AROUND HERE 
TABLE 6 AROUND HERE 
TABLE 7 AROUND HERE 
TABLE 8 AROUND HERE 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate the effect of offshoring production on the skill mix of manufacturing 
firms in Italy over the period 1995-2003. Our analysis consists in comparing the demand for skilled 
relative to unskilled labour by firms that decided to relocate low-skill intensive stages of production 
to cheap labour (Eastern/Central European) countries in 1998-2000 with the relative demand for 
skilled labour of a counterfactual sample of firms that did not move their production abroad. In 
order to control for potential selection bias and for the presence of unobserved factors potentially 
affecting the offshoring decision, we employ a difference-in-differences propensity score matching   21
estimator: the outcome variable is then calculated as the difference in the relative employment share 
of skilled workers between the post-treatment period (2001-2003) and the pre-treatment period 
(1995-1997).  
Our estimates point to a “potential” skill bias effect of production offshoring: even if, as expected, 
the signs of the coefficients for white collars are always positive, they are not significantly different 
from zero. This results, however, may be due to the limited number of treated units we obtain after 
cleaning the dataset. When we further separate the relative shares of skilled and unskilled workers, 
we interestingly find that, while on the one hand offshoring does not seem to enhance the demand 
for skilled personnel, on the other it contributes to reduce the demand for blue collars. This latter 
result still holds if we add the share of clerical workers to the share of blue collars.  
Our results seem to be in line with previous works (Sachs and Shatz 1994; Strauss-Khan 2003; Piva 
and Vivarelli 2004; Hijzen, Görg and Hine 2004) that stress how the skill bias effect of international 
outsourcing is mainly determined by the negative dynamics of the demand for unskilled labour. The 
will to exploit factor cost differentials and the relocation of low-skill intensive phases of the 
production process to cheap labour countries has contributed, at least in the short-medium run, to 
substitute away for domestic employment of manual workers, while keeping the relative share of 
non manuals relatively stable. However, we also find a partial symptom of a complementarity 
between offshoring and the employment for high-skilled labour, i.e. the share of high-skilled and 
low-skilled white collars, but our data do not allow us to draw reliable conclusions about that.  
Moreover, the limited number of treated units may play a role in weakening the significance of our 
estimates, leading us to consider our empirical exercise more like an explorative experiment rather 
than a representative analysis of the Italian manufacturing industry. On this last purpose, further 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Variables definition 
Variable   Definition 
Area 
(dummy) 
North West: Liguria, Lombardia, Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta 
North East: Emilia-Romagna, Friuli Venezia-Giulia, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto  
Center: Lazio,  Marche,  Toscana, Umbria 




1 if the firm offshored at least one phase of the production process to cheap-labour countries (Eastern 




1 if the firm has invested in informatics and ICT in the period 1995-97, 0 otherwise 
EXPORT 
(dummy) 
Export activity  
1 if the firm exported goods in 1995-97, 0 otherwise 
K/Y  Capital intensity 
 Net capital stock over sales  
Y/L  Labour productivity 
Net sales per employee  
ULC  Unit labour cost 
Labour cost per employee 
WC  White Collars 
Managers/Employment + Executives/Employment + Clerks/Employment 
BC  Blue collars 
Workmen/Employment 
WC/BC  Skill ratio 
White collars over blue collars  
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Table A2. Summary statistics for the merged sample 
Variable  Obs (between)  Overall Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
ICT 184  0.701  0.458  0  1 
EXPORT 184  0.712  0.453  0  1 
Total Employment  184  83.954  166.760  10  1801 
Managers/Employment 184  0.014  0.255  0  0.167 
Executives/Employment 184  0.009  0.025  0  0.214 
Clerks/Employment 184  0.202  0.122  0  1 
K/Y (1995-97)  184  65.647  93.072  0.462  1166.634 
Log (K/Y)  184  3.531  1.147  -0.772  7.062 
Y/L (1995-97)  184  318.940  426.992  25.118  5567.856 
Log (Y/L)  184  5.292  0.885  3.224  8.625 
ULC (1995-97)  184  50.699  70.915  6.116  922.069 
Log (ULC)  184  3.516  0.753  1.811  6.827 
WC 184  0.224  0.130  0  1 
Log (WC)  184  -1.656  0.620  -4.883  0 
BC 184  0.717  0.142  0  0.985 
Log (BC)  184  -0.357  0.235  -1.707  -0.015 
WC/BC 184  0.475  0.456  0.002  4.514 




Tables and figures 
 
Table 1a. Sample structure (row percentage) by industry and employment classes 
 
Industry (2-digit ATECO 1991)  Small (10-49) Medium (50-249) Large (250+)
DB: textile and clothing  54.06  32.43  13.51 
DC: leather and footwear  87.50  12.50  0.00 
DG: chemicals and allied products 100.00  0.00  0.00 
DH: rubber and plastic products  80.00  20.00  0.00 
DJ: metal products  70.00  23.33  6.67 
DK: industrial machinery   58.33  33.33  8.34 
 
 
Table 1b. Sample structure by employment classes and geographical area 




11-20 21.6  39.94  58.5  14.01  21.74 
21-50 41.0  37.14  28.5  37.44  42.39 
11-50 62.6  77.08  87.0  51.45  64.13 
51-250 26.5  16.15  11.4  33.82  29.89 
251+ 10.9  6.78  1.6  14.73  5.98 
Geographical area          
North West  40.43  37.54    45.17  47.83 
North East  29.57  27.44    29.47  28.26 
North 70.0  64.98  55.0  74.64  76.09 
Centre 17.28  16.15  21.0  16.18  16.30 
South 12.72  14.40  24.0  9.18  7.61 
Total 4497  4680  95.017  414  184 
 
   30
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of firms offshoring production by industry,  
employment classes and geographical area  
Industry (ATECO 1991)  Offshoring Non offshoring  Total 
DB: textile and clothing  1   36   37 
DC: leather and footwear  1   7  8 
DG: chemicals and allied products 1   1   2 
DH: rubber and plastic products  1   14   15 
DJ: metal products  2   28   30 
DK: industrial machinery   1   35   36 
Total  7   177   184 
Small (11-49)  4 (0.57)  115 (0.65)  119  
Medium (50-249)  1 (0.14)  52 (0.29)  53 
Large (+250)  2 (0.29)  10 (0.06)  12 
Total  7 177  184 
North West  2 (0.29)  86 (0.49)  88 
North East  3 (0.43)  49 (0.28)  52 
Center  1 (0.14)  29 (0.16)  30 
South  1 (0.14)  13 (0.07)  14 
Total  7 (0.04)  177 (0.96)  184 
 
 
Table 3. The structure of offshoring and non offshoring samples 
 
Offshoring 
Variable  Obs Overall  Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
ICT   7  0.857  0.354  0  1 
EXPORT 7  0.857  0.354  0  1 
Total Employment  7  225.667  347.336  16  1163 
Managers/Employment 7  0.016  0.023  0  0.08 
Executives/Employment 7  0.009  0.025  0  0.12 
Clerks/Employment 7 0.171  0.098  0 0.4 
K/Y (1995-97)  7  92.936  99.453  12.925  291.659 
Log (K/Y)  7  3.898  1.170  2.560  5.676 
Y/L (1995-97)  7  445.308  463.571  87.030  1391.964 
Log (Y/L)  7  5.550  1.073  4.467  7.238 
ULC (1995-97)  7  76.766  75.144  19.460  230.517 
Log (ULC)  7  3.947  0.859  2.968  5.440 
WC 7  0.196  0.122  0.032  0.48 
Log (WC)  7  -1.850  0.734  -3.434  -0.734 
BC 7  0.767  0.134  0.44  0.968 
Log (BC)  7  -0.284  0.200  -0.821  -0.033 
WC/BC 7  0.357  0.315  0.033  1.273 












Variable  Obs Overall  Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
ICT   177  0.695  0.461  0  1 
EXPORT 177  0.706  0.456  0  1 
Total Employment  177  78.350  153.041  10  1801 
Managers/Employment 177  0.014  0.026  0  0.167 
Executives/Employment 177  0.009  0.025  0  0.214 
Clerks/Employment 177 0.203  0.122 0  1 
K/Y (1995-97)  177  64.567  92.746  0.462  1166.634 
Log (K/Y)  177  3.517  1.145  -0.772  7.062 
Y/L (1995-97)  177  313.942  425.181  25.118  5567.856 
Log (Y/L)  177  5.28189  0.877  3.224  8.625 
ULC (1995-97)  177  49.668  70.619  6.116  922.069 
Log (ULC)  177  3.499  0.744  1.811  6.827 
WC 177  0.225  0.130  0  1 
Log (WC)  177  -1.648  0.614  -4.883  0 
BC 177  0.715  0.142  0  0.985 
Log (BC)  177  -0.359  0.236  -1.707  -0.015 
WC/BC 177  0.479  0.460  0.002  4.514 
Log (WC/BC)  177  -1.032  0.773  -6.265  1.507 
 
Table 4. Testing the difference in the mean propensity score for treated and controls 
 
Test in block 1 
Two-sample t-test with equal variances 
Group  Obs  Mean  Std. Error  Std. Dev.  
Controls (0)  295  0.054  0.003  0.043 
Treated (1)  18  0.077  0.012  0.051 
Combined 313  0.055  0.025  0.044 
Difference: mean(0)-mean(1)    -0.023  0.011   
t = -2.2278     Degrees of freedom = 311  H0: diff = 0 
H1: diff < 0  
) < Pr( t T = 0.0133   
H1: diff ≥ 0  
) > Pr( t T = 0.0266 
H1: diff > 0 
) > Pr( t T = 0.9867 




Test in block 2 
Two-sample t-test with equal variances 
Group  Obs  Mean  Std. Error  Std. Dev.  
Controls (0)  4  0.278  0.016  0.032 
Treated (1)  3  0.319  0.005  0.009 
Combined 7  0.295  0.012  0.032 
Difference: mean(0)-mean(1)    -0.041  -0.019   
t = -2.1420    Degrees of freedom = 5  H0: diff = 0 
H1: diff < 0  
) < Pr( t T = 0.0425   
H1: diff ≥ 0  
) > Pr( t T = 0.0851 
H1: diff > 0 
) > Pr( t T = 0.9575 
The mean propensity score is not different for treated and controls in block 2 
 




Table 5. The effect of production offshoring on skilled labour: white collars/blue collars 
Skill ratio  ATT-1  Bootstrap s.e.  ATT-2  Bootstrap s.e. 
WC/BC2001/03-WC/BC1995/97 0.265  0.225  0.408  0.345 
WC/BC2001-WC/BC1995/97 0.265  0.248  0.429  0.270 
WC/BC2002-WC/BC1995/97 0.274  0.254  0.390  0.271 
WC/BC2003-WC/BC1995/97 0.257  0.289  0.408*  0.250 
Coefficients with * are significant at 10%; coefficients with ** are significant at 5%. 
Notes: ATT-1 refers to first stage estimates of the propensity score in which a logarithmic transformation has been 
applied to all the continuous variables; ATT-2 refers to first stage estimates of the propensity score in which the 
continuous variables are taken in levels. 




Table 6. The effect of production offshoring on skilled labour: white collars 
White collars employment share  ATT-1  Bootstrap s.e.  ATT-2  Bootstrap s.e. 
WC2001/03-WC1995/97 0.145  0.237  0.277  0.190 
WC2001-WC1995/97 0.169  0.583  0.718  0.548 
WC2002-WC1995/97 0.175  0.568  0.679*  0.407 
WC2003-WC1995/97 0.156  0.561  0.691  0.450 
Coefficients with * are significant at 10%; coefficients with ** are significant at 5%. 
Notes: ATT-1 refers to first stage estimates of the propensity score in which a logarithmic transformation has been 
applied to all the continuous variables; ATT-2 refers to first stage estimates of the propensity score in which the 
continuous variables are taken in levels. 




Table 7. The effect of production offshoring on unskilled labour: blue collars 
Blue collars employment share  ATT-1  Bootstrap s.e.  ATT-2  Bootstrap s.e. 
BC2001/03-BC1995/97 -0.092*  0.048  -0.115**  0.049 
BC2001-BC1995/97  -0.086* 0.049 -0.110* 0.060 
BC2002-BC1995/97  -0.094** 0.042 -0.114** 0.053 
BC2003-BC1995/97 -0.096*  0.053  -0.121**  0.053 
Coefficients with * are significant at 10%; coefficients with ** are significant at 5%. 
Notes: ATT-1 refers to first stage estimates of the propensity score in which a logarithmic transformation has been 
applied to all the continuous variables; ATT-2 refers to first stage estimates of the propensity score in which the 
continuous variables are taken in levels. 




Table 8. The effect of production offshoring on unskilled labour: blue collars and clerks 
BC + Clerks employment share  ATT-1  Bootstrap s.e.  ATT-2  Bootstrap s.e. 
BCCL2001/03-BCCL1995/97 -0.057*  0.034  -0.051  0.043 
BCCL2001-BCCL1995/97 -0.057*  0.034  -0.051  0.043 
BCCL2002-BCCL1995/97 -0.053*  0.032  -0.047  0.048 
BCCL2003-BCCL1995/97 -0.060*  0.034  -0.055  0.040 
Coefficients with * are significant at 10%; coefficients with ** are significant at 5%. 
Notes: ATT-1 refers to first stage estimates of the propensity score in which a logarithmic transformation has been 
applied to all the continuous variables; ATT-2 refers to first stage estimates of the propensity score in which the 
continuous variables are taken in levels. 
Standard errors are bootstrapped (100 repetitions).    33
 
 
Figure 1. Employment trends for treated (offshoring) and untreated firms  
(time of assignment into treatment: 1998-2000) 
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 